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제롬 파월 연준 의장의 잭슨홀 연설(영문)

기사입력 : 2023년08월25일 23:17

최종수정 : 2023년08월26일 00:20

[휴스턴=뉴스핌] 고인원 특파원= 제롬 파월 연준 의장은 2023년 8월 25일 잭슨홀 심포지엄에서 '글로벌 경제의 구조적 변화'을 주제로 연설했다.

이날 파월은 "인플레이션이 여전히 높으며 적절하다고 판단되면 추가 금리 인상이 가능하다"는 매파 발언으로 시장에 충격파를 던졌다.

다음은 미 연준 홈페이지에 게재된 파월 의장의 연설문 전문이다. 원문 그대로 게재한다.

Good morning. At last year's Jackson Hole symposium, I delivered a brief, direct message. My remarks this year will be a bit longer, but the message is the same: It is the Fed's job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so. We have tightened policy significantly over the past year. Although inflation has moved down from its peak—a welcome development—it remains too high. We are prepared to raise rates further if appropriate, and intend to hold policy at a restrictive level until we are confident that inflation is moving sustainably down toward our objective.

Today I will review our progress so far and discuss the outlook and the uncertainties we face as we pursue our dual mandate goals. I will conclude with a summary of what this means for policy. Given how far we have come, at upcoming meetings we are in a position to proceed carefully as we assess the incoming data and the evolving outlook and risks.

The Decline in Inflation So Far
The ongoing episode of high inflation initially emerged from a collision between very strong demand and pandemic-constrained supply. By the time the Federal Open Market Committee raised the policy rate in March 2022, it was clear that bringing down inflation would depend on both the unwinding of the unprecedented pandemic-related demand and supply distortions and on our tightening of monetary policy, which would slow the growth of aggregate demand, allowing supply time to catch up. While these two forces are now working together to bring down inflation, the process still has a long way to go, even with the more favorable recent readings.

On a 12-month basis, U.S. total, or "headline," PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation peaked at 7 percent in June 2022 and declined to 3.3 percent as of July, following a trajectory roughly in line with global trends (figure 1, panel A).1 The effects of Russia's war against Ukraine have been a primary driver of the changes in headline inflation around the world since early 2022. Headline inflation is what households and businesses experience most directly, so this decline is very good news. But food and energy prices are influenced by global factors that remain volatile, and can provide a misleading signal of where inflation is headed. In my remaining comments, I will focus on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and energy components.

On a 12-month basis, core PCE inflation peaked at 5.4 percent in February 2022 and declined gradually to 4.3 percent in July (figure 1, panel B). The lower monthly readings for core inflation in June and July were welcome, but two months of good data are only the beginning of what it will take to build confidence that inflation is moving down sustainably toward our goal. We can't yet know the extent to which these lower readings will continue or where underlying inflation will settle over coming quarters. Twelve-month core inflation is still elevated, and there is substantial further ground to cover to get back to price stability.

To understand the factors that will likely drive further progress, it is useful to separately examine the three broad components of core PCE inflation—inflation for goods, for housing services, and for all other services, sometimes referred to as nonhousing services (figure 2).

Core goods inflation has fallen sharply, particularly for durable goods, as both tighter monetary policy and the slow unwinding of supply and demand dislocations are bringing it down. The motor vehicle sector provides a good illustration. Earlier in the pandemic, demand for vehicles rose sharply, supported by low interest rates, fiscal transfers, curtailed spending on in-person services, and shifts in preference away from using public transportation and from living in cities. But because of a shortage of semiconductors, vehicle supply actually fell. Vehicle prices spiked, and a large pool of pent-up demand emerged. As the pandemic and its effects have waned, production and inventories have grown, and supply has improved. At the same time, higher interest rates have weighed on demand. Interest rates on auto loans have nearly doubled since early last year, and customers report feeling the effect of higher rates on affordability.2 On net, motor vehicle inflation has declined sharply because of the combined effects of these supply and demand factors.

Similar dynamics are playing out for core goods inflation overall. As they do, the effects of monetary restraint should show through more fully over time. Core goods prices fell the past two months, but on a 12-month basis, core goods inflation remains well above its pre-pandemic level. Sustained progress is needed, and restrictive monetary policy is called for to achieve that progress.

In the highly interest-sensitive housing sector, the effects of monetary policy became apparent soon after liftoff. Mortgage rates doubled over the course of 2022, causing housing starts and sales to fall and house price growth to plummet. Growth in market rents soon peaked and then steadily declined (figure 3).3

Measured housing services inflation lagged these changes, as is typical, but has recently begun to fall. This inflation metric reflects rents paid by all tenants, as well as estimates of the equivalent rents that could be earned from homes that are owner occupied.4 Because leases turn over slowly, it takes time for a decline in market rent growth to work its way into the overall inflation measure. The market rent slowdown has only recently begun to show through to that measure. The slowing growth in rents for new leases over roughly the past year can be thought of as "in the pipeline" and will affect measured housing services inflation over the coming year. Going forward, if market rent growth settles near pre-pandemic levels, housing services inflation should decline toward its pre-pandemic level as well. We will continue to watch the market rent data closely for a signal of the upside and downside risks to housing services inflation.

The final category, nonhousing services, accounts for over half of the core PCE index and includes a broad range of services, such as health care, food services, transportation, and accommodations. Twelve-month inflation in this sector has moved sideways since liftoff. Inflation measured over the past three and six months has declined, however, which is encouraging. Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability. Over time, restrictive monetary policy will help bring aggregate supply and demand back into better balance, reducing inflationary pressures in this key sector.

The Outlook
Turning to the outlook, although further unwinding of pandemic-related distortions should continue to put some downward pressure on inflation, restrictive monetary policy will likely play an increasingly important role. Getting inflation sustainably back down to 2 percent is expected to require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some softening in labor market conditions.

Economic growth
Restrictive monetary policy has tightened financial conditions, supporting the expectation of below-trend growth.5 Since last year's symposium, the two-year real yield is up about 250 basis points, and longer-term real yields are higher as well—by nearly 150 basis points.6 Beyond changes in interest rates, bank lending standards have tightened, and loan growth has slowed sharply.7 Such a tightening of broad financial conditions typically contributes to a slowing in the growth of economic activity, and there is evidence of that in this cycle as well. For example, growth in industrial production has slowed, and the amount spent on residential investment has declined in each of the past five quarters (figure 4).

But we are attentive to signs that the economy may not be cooling as expected. So far this year, GDP (gross domestic product) growth has come in above expectations and above its longer-run trend, and recent readings on consumer spending have been especially robust. In addition, after decelerating sharply over the past 18 months, the housing sector is showing signs of picking back up. Additional evidence of persistently above-trend growth could put further progress on inflation at risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy.

The labor market
The rebalancing of the labor market has continued over the past year but remains incomplete. Labor supply has improved, driven by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, the labor force participation rate of women in their prime working years reached an all-time high in June. Demand for labor has moderated as well. Job openings remain high but are trending lower. Payroll job growth has slowed significantly. Total hours worked has been flat over the past six months, and the average workweek has declined to the lower end of its pre-pandemic range, reflecting a gradual normalization in labor market conditions (figure 5).

This rebalancing has eased wage pressures. Wage growth across a range of measures continues to slow, albeit gradually (figure 6). While nominal wage growth must ultimately slow to a rate that is consistent with 2 percent inflation, what matters for households is real wage growth. Even as nominal wage growth has slowed, real wage growth has been increasing as inflation has fallen.

We expect this labor market rebalancing to continue. Evidence that the tightness in the labor market is no longer easing could also call for a monetary policy response.

Uncertainty and Risk Management along the Path Forward
Two percent is and will remain our inflation target. We are committed to achieving and sustaining a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to that level over time. It is challenging, of course, to know in real time when such a stance has been achieved. There are some challenges that are common to all tightening cycles. For example, real interest rates are now positive and well above mainstream estimates of the neutral policy rate. We see the current stance of policy as restrictive, putting downward pressure on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. But we cannot identify with certainty the neutral rate of interest, and thus there is always uncertainty about the precise level of monetary policy restraint.

That assessment is further complicated by uncertainty about the duration of the lags with which monetary tightening affects economic activity and especially inflation. Since the symposium a year ago, the Committee has raised the policy rate by 300 basis points, including 100 basis points over the past seven months. And we have substantially reduced the size of our securities holdings. The wide range of estimates of these lags suggests that there may be significant further drag in the pipeline.

Beyond these traditional sources of policy uncertainty, the supply and demand dislocations unique to this cycle raise further complications through their effects on inflation and labor market dynamics. For example, so far, job openings have declined substantially without increasing unemployment—a highly welcome but historically unusual result that appears to reflect large excess demand for labor. In addition, there is evidence that inflation has become more responsive to labor market tightness than was the case in recent decades.8 These changing dynamics may or may not persist, and this uncertainty underscores the need for agile policymaking.

These uncertainties, both old and new, complicate our task of balancing the risk of tightening monetary policy too much against the risk of tightening too little. Doing too little could allow above-target inflation to become entrenched and ultimately require monetary policy to wring more persistent inflation from the economy at a high cost to employment. Doing too much could also do unnecessary harm to the economy.

Conclusion
As is often the case, we are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies. In such circumstances, risk-management considerations are critical. At upcoming meetings, we will assess our progress based on the totality of the data and the evolving outlook and risks. Based on this assessment, we will proceed carefully as we decide whether to tighten further or, instead, to hold the policy rate constant and await further data. Restoring price stability is essential to achieving both sides of our dual mandate. We will need price stability to achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.

We will keep at it until the job is done.

koinwon@newspim.com

[뉴스핌 베스트 기사]

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[이재명의 사람들] '집사' 김남준 [서울=뉴스핌] 지혜진 기자 = 김남준 대통령 제1부속실장은 '진심으로 이재명을 위하는 사람'으로 꼽힌다. 지난해 총선 이후 이재명 대통령이 당대표로서 확고한 리더십을 확립하면서 '이제는 민주당 의원 170여명 모두가 친명(친이재명)'이라는 말이 나올 때도 김 실장은 이 대통령의 안위와 향후 행보를 진심으로 걱정하는 '진짜 이재명의 사람'으로 평가받았다. 그렇기에 김 실장은 이 대통령의 선택에 매번 신중하고 우려스러운 시각을 나타냈었다. 일례로 김 실장은 이 대통령의 당대표 연임을 반대했다. 지난해 6월쯤 당내 기류는 '리더십이 공고한 이 대통령이 한번 더 당대표를 해야 한다'는 입장이 지배적이었다. 그러나 참모인 김 실장은 "당을 위해선 연임을 하는 게 맞겠으나 본인(이재명)의 대권을 위해선 안하는 게 맞다"는 입장이었다. 조기대선을 예상할 수 없던 그 시점에는 연임하는 당대표가 2026년 지방선거 공천까지 책임질 각오를 해야 했다. 이미 총선을 압승으로 이끈 '성공한 당대표'였던 이 대통령이 굳이 연임해서 지방선거라는 변수를 책임질 필요가 없다는 게 김 실장의 시각이었다. 김남준 제1부속실장. [사진=김남준 SNS] 2022년 대선에서 패배한 이 대통령이 인천 계양을 보궐선거에 참전하는 것도 반대했다. 대신 원외에서 당대표에 도전하라고 조언했다. 이 대통령이 너무 일찍 국회에 입성하면 이미지나 에너지 소모가 너무 클 수 있다는 우려 탓이다. 오로지 '대통령 이재명'이 되는 데 유리한 선택이 무엇인지 고민한 것이다. 이번 대선을 앞두고는 이 대통령의 'PI'(President Identity)를 고민하면서 온화하고 무게감 있는 이미지를 부각하려고 애썼다. 성남시장이나 경기도지사 때 이 대통령의 강한 이미지가 두드러진 만큼 대통령으로서는 신중함을 강조하려고 뒷받침했다. 그러한 노력 중 하나가 이 대통령이 자신의 페이스북에 글을 못남기도록 비밀번호를 바꾼 일이다. SNS(소셜네트워크서비스) 소통에 능한 이 대통령이 밤 늦은 시각에 '날 것 그대로'의 발언을 올릴까 우려해서다. 현안에 대해 깊이 있는 토론이 가능한 이 대통령의 장점을 살리기 위해 짧은 공중파 방송 인터뷰보다 1시간 이상 길게 이야기할 수 있는 유튜브 방송에 이 대통령이 출연하도록 조언하기도 했다. 김 실장은 성남 지역 케이블방송 기자 출신으로 이 대통령과 함께 일한 지는 10여년 정도 됐다. 2014년 재선 성남시장이던 이 대통령은 김 실장에게 성남시 대변인 자리를 제안했다. 이 대통령이 경기도지사에 당선됐을 때는 경기도청 언론비서관으로 일했다. 이후 국회에 입성해서도 김 실장은 의원실 보좌관, 정무조정부실장 등을 역임하며 이 대통령의 최측근에서 보좌했다. 이번 대선 선거대책위원회에선 후보 일정팀 선임팀장을 맡았다. 언론인 출신인 만큼 언론 소통을 총괄해왔다. 국회 기자들뿐만 아니라 이 대통령의 수사와 재판을 취재하는 법조 기자들도 김 실장이 직접 소통한 것으로 알려졌다. '체력 좋은' 이 대통령의 일정을 보좌하느라 계엄 직후인 올해 초에는 한동안 벌겋게 충혈된 눈으로 업무를 보기도 했다. 김 실장이 담당할 제1부속실은 대통령의 일정, 수행, 현안보고 등 대통령을 최지근거리에서 보좌하는 곳이다. 매 정권마다 대통령의 복심이 제1부속실장 자리를 맡아왔다. '문고리' 혹은 '문지기' 권력으로도 불린다. heyjin@newspim.com 2025-06-13 14:08
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李대통령, 오광수 민정수석 사의 수용 [서울=뉴스핌] 이영태 선임기자 = 이재명 대통령은 13일 전날 밤 사의를 표명한 오광수 대통령실 민정수석비서관의 사의를 수용했다. 강유정 대통령실 대변인은 이날 오전 브리핑에서 "오광수 민정수석이 어젯밤 이재명 대통령께 사의를 표했다"며 이같이 말했다. 오광수 대통령실 민정수석비서관 [사진=대통령실] 강 대변인은 "이 대통령은 공직기강 확립과 인사 검증을 담당하는 민정수석의 중요성을 두루 감안해 오 수석의 사의를 받아들였다"고 전했다. 이어 "대통령실은 이재명 대통령의 사법개혁 의지와 국정 철학을 깊이 이해하고 이에 발맞춰 가는 인사로 조속한 시일 내에 차기 민정수석을 임명할 예정"이라고 부연했다. 대통령실 관계자는 차명 부동산과 차명 계좌 의혹으로 오 수석이 물러난 만큼 차기 민정수석 검증 기준에 청렴함 등이 포함될 것이야는 질문에 "일단 저희가 가지고 있는 국정철학을 가장 잘 이해하고 이를 시행할 수 있는 분이 가장 우선적인 이재명 정부의 인사검증 원칙이라고 할 수 있겠다"며 "새 정부에 대한 국민들의 기대감이 워낙 크기 때문에 그 기대에 부응하는 게 첫 번째 사명"이라고 답했다. 이 관계자는 오 수석 건을 계기로 인사 검증 기준이라 원칙이 마련될 수 있느냐는 질의에는 "이 대통령이 여러 번 표방했던 것처럼 우리 정부에 대한 기대감, 그리고 실용적이면서 능력 위주의 인사가 첫 번째 가장 먼저 포방될 원칙"이라며 "그리고 여러 가지 우리 국민들이 요청하고 있는 바에 대한 다방면적인 검토는 있을 예정"이라고 언급했다. medialyt@newspim.com 2025-06-13 09:43
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