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제롬 파월 연준 의장의 잭슨홀 연설(영문)

기사입력 : 2023년08월25일 23:17

최종수정 : 2023년08월26일 00:20

[휴스턴=뉴스핌] 고인원 특파원= 제롬 파월 연준 의장은 2023년 8월 25일 잭슨홀 심포지엄에서 '글로벌 경제의 구조적 변화'을 주제로 연설했다.

이날 파월은 "인플레이션이 여전히 높으며 적절하다고 판단되면 추가 금리 인상이 가능하다"는 매파 발언으로 시장에 충격파를 던졌다.

다음은 미 연준 홈페이지에 게재된 파월 의장의 연설문 전문이다. 원문 그대로 게재한다.

Good morning. At last year's Jackson Hole symposium, I delivered a brief, direct message. My remarks this year will be a bit longer, but the message is the same: It is the Fed's job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so. We have tightened policy significantly over the past year. Although inflation has moved down from its peak—a welcome development—it remains too high. We are prepared to raise rates further if appropriate, and intend to hold policy at a restrictive level until we are confident that inflation is moving sustainably down toward our objective.

Today I will review our progress so far and discuss the outlook and the uncertainties we face as we pursue our dual mandate goals. I will conclude with a summary of what this means for policy. Given how far we have come, at upcoming meetings we are in a position to proceed carefully as we assess the incoming data and the evolving outlook and risks.

The Decline in Inflation So Far
The ongoing episode of high inflation initially emerged from a collision between very strong demand and pandemic-constrained supply. By the time the Federal Open Market Committee raised the policy rate in March 2022, it was clear that bringing down inflation would depend on both the unwinding of the unprecedented pandemic-related demand and supply distortions and on our tightening of monetary policy, which would slow the growth of aggregate demand, allowing supply time to catch up. While these two forces are now working together to bring down inflation, the process still has a long way to go, even with the more favorable recent readings.

On a 12-month basis, U.S. total, or "headline," PCE (personal consumption expenditures) inflation peaked at 7 percent in June 2022 and declined to 3.3 percent as of July, following a trajectory roughly in line with global trends (figure 1, panel A).1 The effects of Russia's war against Ukraine have been a primary driver of the changes in headline inflation around the world since early 2022. Headline inflation is what households and businesses experience most directly, so this decline is very good news. But food and energy prices are influenced by global factors that remain volatile, and can provide a misleading signal of where inflation is headed. In my remaining comments, I will focus on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and energy components.

On a 12-month basis, core PCE inflation peaked at 5.4 percent in February 2022 and declined gradually to 4.3 percent in July (figure 1, panel B). The lower monthly readings for core inflation in June and July were welcome, but two months of good data are only the beginning of what it will take to build confidence that inflation is moving down sustainably toward our goal. We can't yet know the extent to which these lower readings will continue or where underlying inflation will settle over coming quarters. Twelve-month core inflation is still elevated, and there is substantial further ground to cover to get back to price stability.

To understand the factors that will likely drive further progress, it is useful to separately examine the three broad components of core PCE inflation—inflation for goods, for housing services, and for all other services, sometimes referred to as nonhousing services (figure 2).

Core goods inflation has fallen sharply, particularly for durable goods, as both tighter monetary policy and the slow unwinding of supply and demand dislocations are bringing it down. The motor vehicle sector provides a good illustration. Earlier in the pandemic, demand for vehicles rose sharply, supported by low interest rates, fiscal transfers, curtailed spending on in-person services, and shifts in preference away from using public transportation and from living in cities. But because of a shortage of semiconductors, vehicle supply actually fell. Vehicle prices spiked, and a large pool of pent-up demand emerged. As the pandemic and its effects have waned, production and inventories have grown, and supply has improved. At the same time, higher interest rates have weighed on demand. Interest rates on auto loans have nearly doubled since early last year, and customers report feeling the effect of higher rates on affordability.2 On net, motor vehicle inflation has declined sharply because of the combined effects of these supply and demand factors.

Similar dynamics are playing out for core goods inflation overall. As they do, the effects of monetary restraint should show through more fully over time. Core goods prices fell the past two months, but on a 12-month basis, core goods inflation remains well above its pre-pandemic level. Sustained progress is needed, and restrictive monetary policy is called for to achieve that progress.

In the highly interest-sensitive housing sector, the effects of monetary policy became apparent soon after liftoff. Mortgage rates doubled over the course of 2022, causing housing starts and sales to fall and house price growth to plummet. Growth in market rents soon peaked and then steadily declined (figure 3).3

Measured housing services inflation lagged these changes, as is typical, but has recently begun to fall. This inflation metric reflects rents paid by all tenants, as well as estimates of the equivalent rents that could be earned from homes that are owner occupied.4 Because leases turn over slowly, it takes time for a decline in market rent growth to work its way into the overall inflation measure. The market rent slowdown has only recently begun to show through to that measure. The slowing growth in rents for new leases over roughly the past year can be thought of as "in the pipeline" and will affect measured housing services inflation over the coming year. Going forward, if market rent growth settles near pre-pandemic levels, housing services inflation should decline toward its pre-pandemic level as well. We will continue to watch the market rent data closely for a signal of the upside and downside risks to housing services inflation.

The final category, nonhousing services, accounts for over half of the core PCE index and includes a broad range of services, such as health care, food services, transportation, and accommodations. Twelve-month inflation in this sector has moved sideways since liftoff. Inflation measured over the past three and six months has declined, however, which is encouraging. Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability. Over time, restrictive monetary policy will help bring aggregate supply and demand back into better balance, reducing inflationary pressures in this key sector.

The Outlook
Turning to the outlook, although further unwinding of pandemic-related distortions should continue to put some downward pressure on inflation, restrictive monetary policy will likely play an increasingly important role. Getting inflation sustainably back down to 2 percent is expected to require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some softening in labor market conditions.

Economic growth
Restrictive monetary policy has tightened financial conditions, supporting the expectation of below-trend growth.5 Since last year's symposium, the two-year real yield is up about 250 basis points, and longer-term real yields are higher as well—by nearly 150 basis points.6 Beyond changes in interest rates, bank lending standards have tightened, and loan growth has slowed sharply.7 Such a tightening of broad financial conditions typically contributes to a slowing in the growth of economic activity, and there is evidence of that in this cycle as well. For example, growth in industrial production has slowed, and the amount spent on residential investment has declined in each of the past five quarters (figure 4).

But we are attentive to signs that the economy may not be cooling as expected. So far this year, GDP (gross domestic product) growth has come in above expectations and above its longer-run trend, and recent readings on consumer spending have been especially robust. In addition, after decelerating sharply over the past 18 months, the housing sector is showing signs of picking back up. Additional evidence of persistently above-trend growth could put further progress on inflation at risk and could warrant further tightening of monetary policy.

The labor market
The rebalancing of the labor market has continued over the past year but remains incomplete. Labor supply has improved, driven by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels. Indeed, the labor force participation rate of women in their prime working years reached an all-time high in June. Demand for labor has moderated as well. Job openings remain high but are trending lower. Payroll job growth has slowed significantly. Total hours worked has been flat over the past six months, and the average workweek has declined to the lower end of its pre-pandemic range, reflecting a gradual normalization in labor market conditions (figure 5).

This rebalancing has eased wage pressures. Wage growth across a range of measures continues to slow, albeit gradually (figure 6). While nominal wage growth must ultimately slow to a rate that is consistent with 2 percent inflation, what matters for households is real wage growth. Even as nominal wage growth has slowed, real wage growth has been increasing as inflation has fallen.

We expect this labor market rebalancing to continue. Evidence that the tightness in the labor market is no longer easing could also call for a monetary policy response.

Uncertainty and Risk Management along the Path Forward
Two percent is and will remain our inflation target. We are committed to achieving and sustaining a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to that level over time. It is challenging, of course, to know in real time when such a stance has been achieved. There are some challenges that are common to all tightening cycles. For example, real interest rates are now positive and well above mainstream estimates of the neutral policy rate. We see the current stance of policy as restrictive, putting downward pressure on economic activity, hiring, and inflation. But we cannot identify with certainty the neutral rate of interest, and thus there is always uncertainty about the precise level of monetary policy restraint.

That assessment is further complicated by uncertainty about the duration of the lags with which monetary tightening affects economic activity and especially inflation. Since the symposium a year ago, the Committee has raised the policy rate by 300 basis points, including 100 basis points over the past seven months. And we have substantially reduced the size of our securities holdings. The wide range of estimates of these lags suggests that there may be significant further drag in the pipeline.

Beyond these traditional sources of policy uncertainty, the supply and demand dislocations unique to this cycle raise further complications through their effects on inflation and labor market dynamics. For example, so far, job openings have declined substantially without increasing unemployment—a highly welcome but historically unusual result that appears to reflect large excess demand for labor. In addition, there is evidence that inflation has become more responsive to labor market tightness than was the case in recent decades.8 These changing dynamics may or may not persist, and this uncertainty underscores the need for agile policymaking.

These uncertainties, both old and new, complicate our task of balancing the risk of tightening monetary policy too much against the risk of tightening too little. Doing too little could allow above-target inflation to become entrenched and ultimately require monetary policy to wring more persistent inflation from the economy at a high cost to employment. Doing too much could also do unnecessary harm to the economy.

Conclusion
As is often the case, we are navigating by the stars under cloudy skies. In such circumstances, risk-management considerations are critical. At upcoming meetings, we will assess our progress based on the totality of the data and the evolving outlook and risks. Based on this assessment, we will proceed carefully as we decide whether to tighten further or, instead, to hold the policy rate constant and await further data. Restoring price stability is essential to achieving both sides of our dual mandate. We will need price stability to achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.

We will keep at it until the job is done.

koinwon@newspim.com

[뉴스핌 베스트 기사]

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강릉 옥계항 코카인 추정 마약 대량 적발 [세종=뉴스핌] 백승은 기자 = 관세청과 해양경찰청이 강릉 옥계항에 입항하는 외국 무역선 선박을 수색애 코카인으로 의심되는 마약을 대량 적발해 조사 중이라고 2일 밝혔다. 전날 두 기관은 미국 연방수사국(FBI)과 국토안보수사국(HSI)으로부터 A선밖에 마약이 숨겨져 있다는 정보를 입수했다. A 선박은 벌크선으로 3만2000톤이며, 승선원 외국인은 20명이다. 관세청과 해양경찰청이 강릉 옥계항에 입항하는 외국 무역선 선박을 수색해 코카인으로 의심되는 마약을 대량 적발했다. [사진=관세청] 2025.04.02 100wins@newspim.com 두 기관은 합동 검색작전을 수립하고, 선박의 규모가 길이 185미터(m)인 점과 검색 범위 등을 고려해 서울세관·동해해경청 마약 수사요원 90명 및 세관 마약탐지견 2팀 등 합동 검색팀을 구성했다. 검색팀은 2일 오전 6시 30분 옥계항에 긴급 출동해 A 선박이 입항한 직후 선박에 올라타 집중 수색을 실시했다. 수색 중 검색팀은 선박 기관실 뒤편에서 밀실을 발견했고, 집중 수색 결과 개당 약 20킬로그램(kg) 전후 마약으로 의심되는 물질이 담긴 박스 수십 개를 발견했다. 검색팀이 간이시약으로 검사한 결과 코카인 의심 물질로 확인됐다. 정확한 중량은 하선 이후 정밀 계측기를 통해 측정하고 마약 종류는 국가과학수사연구원에 의뢰해 확인할 예정이다. 앞으로 관세청과 해경청은 합동수사팀을 운영해 해당 선박의 선장 및 선원 등 20여명을 대상으로 밀수 공모 여부와 적발된 마약의 출처 등을 수사할 계획이다. 국제 마약 밀매 조직과의 연관성도 고려해 미국 FBI와 HSI 등 관계 기관과의 공조를 통해 수사를 확대할 방침이다. 100wins@newspim.com 2025-04-02 17:57
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재주는 트럼프가, 돈은 브라질이 [서울=뉴스핌] 최원진 기자= 도널드 트럼프 미국 행정부의 관세 공세로 글로벌 무역전쟁이 격화하는 가운데, 브라질이 주요 승자로 부상하고 있다고 월스트리트저널(WSJ)이 1일(현지시간) 보도했다. 보도에 따르면, 중국은 트럼프 대통령이 부과한 대중(對中) 관세에 맞서 미국산 농산물에 보복 관세를 매기며 대체 수입처로 브라질을 주목하고 있다. 수출입 컨테이너 [사진=블룸버그] 중국 가공업체들은 트럼프 대통령이 지난 1월 취임하기 전부터 브라질산 대두를 비축하기 시작했고, 올해 1분기 필요한 물량의 거의 전량을 브라질에서 조달했다. 이는 지난해 같은 기간 54% 수준이었던 브라질산 비중과 비교하면 큰 폭의 증가다. 가격도 상승세다. 상파울루대학 산하 연구기관 세페아(CEPEA)에 따르면, 브라질 항구에서 선적되는 대두의 프리미엄은 중국이 미국산 대두에 10% 관세를 발표한 직후 일주일 동안 약 70% 급등했다. 3월 선적 기준으로는 부셸당 85센트를 기록해 3년 만에 최고치를 찍었다. 닭고기와 달걀 수출도 두 자릿수 증가율을 보인다. 브라질의 가금류·돼지고기·달걀 수출업체를 대표하는 브라질동물단백질협회(ABPA)의 히카르두 산틴 협회장은 올해 들어 브라질의 닭고기 수출은 지난해 같은 기간보다 9%, 달걀 수출은 20% 증가했다고 밝혔다. 브라질은 미국과 달리 조류 인플루엔자를 겪고 있지 않아, 안정적인 공급처로 주목받고 있다. 여기에 중국이 미국산 닭고기에 15%의 보복관세를 부과하면서 브라질산이 대안으로 떠오르고 있다는 설명이다. 사실 브라질과 중국의 교역 관계는 최근 수년 빠르게 확대됐다. 중국은 2009년에 미국을 제치고 브라질의 최대 무역 파트너로 부상했다. 쇠고기, 철광석, 석유 등 자원이 풍부한 브라질은 중국의 막대한 수요에 맞춰 수출을 확대해 왔고, 중국은 브라질의 인프라 건설에 대규모 자본을 투입하고 있다. 현재 중국은 브라질 전체 전력 공급의 약 10%를 차지하고 있으며, 항만과 도로, 철도 등 주요 기반 시설 건설에도 깊숙이 관여하고 있다. 브라질은 미국 시장에서도 수출 확대 가능성을 보고 있다. 중국은 미국의 주요 신발 수출국인데, 미국이 중국산 제품에 고율 관세를 부과할 경우 아시아를 제외하고 최대 신발 생산국인 브라질이 그 자리를 일부 대체할 수 있다는 전망이 나온다다. 하롤두 페헤이라 브라질 신발산업협회(Abicalçados) 회장은 "브라질산 제품에 별다른 관세가 없다면, 미국 수출 확대의 기회가 될 수 있다"라고 밝혔다. 글로벌 무역전쟁 국면에서 오히려 특수를 누릴 것이라는 기대는 브라질 증시에도 훈풍으로 작용했다. 올 들어 브라질 증시는 9% 넘게 오르며 뉴욕 증시를 아웃퍼폼하고 있다. 올 들어 브라질 증시는 9% 넘게 상승, 연중 5% 가까이 하락한 뉴욕증시의 S&P500 지수와 대조를 이룬다 [사진=koyfin] wonjc6@newspim.com   2025-04-02 15:30
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